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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a cooperative scheme between primary and secondary networks. In this scheme, a
secondary user (SU) accepts a lease of a part of the licensed band according to a cooperative request of a primary user
(PU). Hence, the SU helps the PU in transmitting primary signals and has an opportunity to access the frequency
spectrum. On the other hand, the SU owns important data and may mistrust the intention of a primary transmitter.
Physical layer security is applied to evaluate the cooperative efficiency in terms of the data transmission and data
security. The numerical and simulative results show that the system performance of the primary network in the
cooperative scheme is improved in terms of the outage probability and the symbol error rate and is compared with
that in the direct transmission scheme. In addition, the secure performance of the secondary network, as expressed by
the outage secrecy probability and the average secrecy capacity, is maintained under the eavesdropping of the
primary transmitter.
Keywords: Spectrum sharing; Cooperative communication; Physical layer security; Decode-and-forward; Outage
probability; Symbol error rate; Outage secrecy probability; Average secrecy capacity
1 Introduction
Cognitive radio (CR) is a concept that enhances the uti-
lization efficiency of the licensed frequency spectrum
in that wireless devices are continuously developed for
modern applications, but the spectrum bands are lim-
ited [1]. In cognitive radio networks, unlicensed users,
which are known as secondary users (SUs), only access the
licensed bands without causing interference to licensed
users, which are known as primary users (PUs). To do
this, SUs always opportunistically sense the presence or
absence of the licensed bands tomake a transmission deci-
sion. When the quality of service (QoS) of the primary
network is very high, the transmission of the secondary
network depends on the cooperative request of the PU. In
this scheme, the PU leases a part of the licensed band to
the SU to increase the QoS of the primary network as well
as the spectrum access capacity of the secondary network
[2-5]. At this time, a SU has the right to use the licensed
band, but the SU does not know the artifice of PUs which
PUs want to eavesdrop on the information of the SU.
Due to the broadcast characteristic of the wireless
environment, the secrecy of data transmissions is very
important. Physical layer security is proposed to solve the
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security problem in which the secrecy principle is based
on the exploitation of the physical characteristics of the
wireless channel [6-24]. In [6], Wyner showed that the
important data is secure if the quality of the main channel
is larger than that of the wiretap channel. Physical layer
security has been investigated in the Gaussian channel [7],
the broadcast channel [8], and the wireless fading chan-
nels [9] and has been extended to the relay-eavesdropper
channel [10], the parallel relay-eavesdropper channel [11],
and the multi-access channel [12,13,15]. The achievable
secrecy rate (ASR) is the metric used to measure the
amount of secure data that is successfully received at the
intended user [17]. In [17,19], global channel state infor-
mation (CSI) is available in which Dong et al. regarded
a practical assumption that the eavesdropper nodes are
active and their CSIs are monitored by the center network
[17]. Kim et al. assumed that the source and relay nodes
can detect the CSI based on frequent response messages
of the eavesdropper nodes. These messages will be used to
inform the source node that the eavesdropper nodes want
to be served in the next phases [20]. Exploitation of relays
has been proposed to overcome the fading environment as
well as to enhance secrecy capacity [10,11,17-24]. Optimal
relay selection methods [18,23] and weight optimization
methods of the cooperative relays [17,19] have been stud-
ied tomaximize the ASR and satisfy a total transmit power
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constraint. In [21-24], a utilization of jamming signals
has been investigated in which friendly wireless nodes
or relays operate as jammers to create artificial interfer-
ence to reduce the quality of the eavesdropping channel.
The authors assumed that the jamming signals are known
at both the destination nodes and the relays; hence, the
quality of the desired channel cannot be affected by the
interference signals. A special case in which the coopera-
tive relay does not behave as a trusted node is proposed
[25].
In [4,5], the SUs have opportunity to wiretap the pri-
mary data of the PUs, and then these SUs are mistrusted
as eavesdropper nodes. In [16-18,20], the eavesdropper
nodes are assumed as special wireless nodes, whereas
the primary data are wiretapped by nodes as relays in
[19,25]. Motivated by the above issues, in this paper, we
propose a cooperative scheme between the primary and
secondary networks in which the PU leases a part of
the licensed band to the SU to improve the performance
of its system. In this proposed scheme, the SU uses the
licensed band to perform two jobs as follows: First, the
SU helps the PU by decoding and using the amount of
power needed for forwarding the primary signals. Sec-
ond, the SU uses the remaining power to transmit the
important data against the eavesdropping of the primary
transmitter. The cooperative efficiency of the primary net-
work is obtained in terms of the outage probability and
symbol error rate (SER) and is compared with the direct
transmission scheme. For the secondary network, the out-
age secrecy probability and the average secrecy capacity
are presented to evaluate the efficiency of the spectrum
lease.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we present the cooperative system model and
operation principle. The performance analysis of the pri-
mary and secondary networks is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the numerical and simulative results
using the Monte Carlo method and theoretical expres-
sions. The conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
2 Systemmodel
Figure 1 presents a system model of cooperative commu-
nication between primary and secondary networks. The
primary network includes the primary transmitter (PT)
and primary receiver (PR) and has a licensed spectrum
band. On the other hand, the primary network does not
share this spectrum band, because its QoS is very high.
The secondary network has two nodes, denoted as a sec-
ondary transmitter (ST) and a secondary receiver (SR),
where the ST only transmits its data when receiving a
spectrum lease contract from the PT.We assume that each
node has a single antenna and the same transmit power
P and that all nodes suffer the zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the same variance N0.
Figure 1 Systemmodel of cooperative communication between
primary and secondary networks.
In Figure 1, (h1, d1), (h2, d2), (h31, d3), (h32, d3),
(h4, d4), and (h5, d5) denote the Rayleigh fading channel
coefficients and the link distances of ST-SR, ST-PR, PT-
ST, ST-PT, PT-SR, and PT-PR, respectively. Therefore, the
channel gains gi = |hi|2 and g3j =
∣∣h3j∣∣2 are exponential
distribution random variables (RVs) with parameters λi
and λ3, respectively, which are given as λi = dβi and λ3 =
dβ3 where β is the path loss exponent, i ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5} , j ∈{1, 2}. We note that links PT-ST and ST-PT have the same
distance but different direction.
Before transmitting a data packet, a connection estab-
lishment phase is performed using the media access
control (MAC) layer protocol, which is similar to the
CoopMAC in [26]. First, PT broadcasts a request-to-send
(RTS) message to nodes ST, SR, and PR. Hence, ST can
estimate the fading channel coefficient h31 when receiving
the RTSmessage. Because of the transmission desire of the
secondary network on the licensed band, ST will imme-
diately reply to the RTS message by sending a helper-
ready-to-send (HTS) to nodes PT, PR, and SR. Relying
on the receipt of the RTS and HTS messages, nodes PR
and SR can estimate the fading channel coefficient pairs
(h5, h2) and (h4, h1), respectively, and then these nodes
will broadcast clear-to-send (CTS) messages that include
their estimated fading channel coefficients. If PT wants
to cooperate with ST, it will send a RTS message which
includes h32 estimated from the HTS message to notify a
cooperative acceptance to ST. Based on the above steps of
the setup phase, ST will know the fading channel coeffi-
cients (h31, h32) from the RTS messages, (h4, h1) from the
CTS message of SR, and (h5, h2) from the CTS message
of PR. Therefore, ST can select a power sharing param-
eter as well as evaluate the secrecy performance of the
secondary network. Similarly, PT will know the fading
channel coefficients h31, h2, and h5 for selecting the coop-
erative method and analyzing the system performance of
the primary network.
The operation principle and related formulations of the
system model are expressed in two time slots as follows:
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In the first time slot, PT broadcasts a signal xP to ST, SR,
and PR by using a RTS message [26]. The received signals
at ST, SR, and PR are given, respectively, as
yPT-ST =
√
Ph31xP + nST (1)
yPT-SR =
√
Ph4xP + nSR (2)
yPT-PR =
√
Ph5xP + nPR (3)
where nST, nSR, and nPR are the zero-mean AWGN at
nodes ST, SR, and PR, respectively.
In this case, ST can successfully decode the signal xP.
Then, if the PR cannot successfully decode the signal xP, it
will send a CTS message. After that, PT receives the CTS
message, and it will send a RTS message to ST to require
cooperation. Because the secondary network cannot use
the licensed spectrum band of the primary network, ST
will accept the cooperation request of PT by leasing a
part of the licensed spectrum band. This procedure is per-
formed at ST by combining the signal xP with its signal xS






(1 − α)PxS (4)
where α (0 < α < 1) is the fraction of the transmit power
allocated to the signal xP and αP is like the money of
the secondary network for payment of a leased spectrum
band.
Then, ST broadcasts the combined signal xC to nodes
SR, PR, and even PT. The received signals at SR, PR, and





















h32 + nPT (7)
where nPT is the zero-mean AWGN at node PT.
At node PR, the well-known maximal ratio combining
(MRC) technique is employed from two signals that are
received from PT (the first time slot) and ST (the second
time slot) to decode xP [4], Equation 23, so the received






(1 − α)P|h2|2 + N0
= γ g5 + αγ g2
(1 − α) γ g2 + 1 (8)
where γ = P/N0 is the transmit SNR.
Because SR also receives the signal xP in the first time
slot, there are two cases for decoding the signal xP from
the received signal (2) as + SR successfully decodes xP, and
then SR can cancel the interference component xP in (5).




(1 − α)PxSh1 + nSR (9)
and the corresponding received SNR γ1 at SR is given to
decode xS as
γ1 = (1 − α)P|h1|
2
N0
= (1 − α) γ g1 (10)
+ SR does not successfully decode xP, and then the
received SNR γ1 at SR is expressed as
γ1 = (1 − α)P|h1|
2
αP|h1|2 + N0 =
(1 − α) γ g1
αγ g1 + 1 (11)
In addition, the secondary network has important data
and suspects the help request of the primary network,
so physical layer security is applied to the secondary net-
work in evaluating the secure performance. In this system
model, we assume that PT wants to eavesdrop the sig-
nal xS of ST while PR only receives the signal xP of PT
in the second time slot. The received ASR at SR is given
as [17]
ASR = {RST-SR − RST-PT}+ (12)
where {x}+ is noted for max(0, x) function; RST-SR and
RST-PT are the achievable data rates of links ST-SR and
ST-PT, respectively, and are given as
RST-SR = 12 log2 (1 + γ1) (13)
RST-PT = 12 log2 (1 + γ32) (14)
where the factor (1/2) means that the signals are transmit-
ted in two time slots, and γ32 is the received SNR at PT
from ST to decode the signal xS.
From (7), xP is the transmitted signal of the eavesdrop-
per PT. The xP can be considered as a side information
that is available at the transmitter ST and the eavesdrop-
per PT [27]. Hence, the eavesdropper PT can cancel the
self-interference xP. As a result, the received SNR γ32 at
PT is given as
γ32 = (1 − α)P|h32|
2
N0
= (1 − α) γ g32 (15)
3 Performance analysis
3.1 The primary network: outage probability and symbol
error rate
3.1.1 Outage probability
In this paper, it is assumed that a receiver drops an out-
age event in the decoding operation if the achievable data
rate is less than a target data rate. The achievable data rate
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between PT and ST is given in the first time slot from (1)
as
RPT-ST = 12 log2
(
1 + γ g31
)
(16)
If the achievable data rate RPT-ST is less than the target
data rate RP of the primary network, ST cannot success-
fully decode xP. The outage probability at ST in this case
is given as






= 1 − e−λ3θ/γ (17)
where θ = 22RP − 1.
We note that g31 in (16) and g32 in (15) have different
meanings because these symbols are calculated in the dif-
ferent time slots and directions. Hence, we can assume
that g31 and g32 are independent exponential RVs with the
same parameter λ3.When ST successfully decodes the sig-
nal xP, ST accepts the help request of PT and combines
xP with its signal xS as xC in (4). After applying the MRC
technique, the achievable data rate at PR is given as
RMRCPT-PR =
1
2 log2 (1 + γMRC) (18)





= Pr [γMRC < θ ] = FγMRC(θ)
(19)
where FγMRC(x) is the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the RV γMRC.
Theorem 1. The following single-integral form expression













(1−α)γ du, x ≥ α1 − α
1−e−λ5x/γ − λ5e
(αλ5+λ2)/(1−α)/γ






(1−α)γ du, x< α1−α
(20)
Proof. The proof is performed in Appendix 1.
From Theorem 1, the outage probability at PR is















(1−α)γ du , θ ≥ α1 − α










(1−α)γ du, θ < α1 − α
(21)
We denote m(u) as a function of variable u and is
defined as m (u) = λ5u + αλ2/u, u ∈ [0,∞). By per-
forming a function survey method, m(u) is minimum
at m (u∗), is a decreasing function in [0,u∗], and is an
increasing function in [u∗,∞), where u∗ = √αλ2/λ5.
Hence, Theorem 2 will obtain a lower bound of PMRCPT-PR as

























m (α) , η > α
m (u∗) , η ≤ α,  =⎧⎨
⎩
m (α) , η > α
m (u∗) ,α ≥ η > (α − θ (1 − α))2/2
m (α − θ (1 − α)) , η ≤ (α − θ (1 − α))2/2 and
η = λ2/λ5.
Proof. Given in Appendix 2.
When node ST does not successfully decode xP, node
PR only receives the direct signal from PT in the first time
slot, so γMRC equals γ g5 in (8). The outage probability at
PR in this case is given as
PoutPT-PR = Pr
[
γ g5 < θ
] = 1 − e−λ5θ/γ (23)
Finally, based on the operation principle of coopera-
tive communication between primary and secondary net-
works, the outage probability of the primary network
is a combination of the outage probabilities, which are





PMRCPT-PR + PoutPT-STPoutPT-PR (24)
where PoutPT-ST, PMRCPT-PR, and PoutPT-PR are obtained in (17), (21)
and (23), respectively.
In addition, from Theorem 2 and (24), the lower bound






PMRC_lowerPT-PR + PoutPT-STPoutPT-PR (25)
where PMRC_lowerPT-PR is obtained in (22).
Next, we compare the proposed cooperative transmis-
sion protocol with the direct transmission protocol (DT
protocol). In the DT protocol, PT directly transmits the
signal xP to PRwithout the help of ST. In this case, ST does
not have opportunities to transmit its signal xS. For a fair
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evaluation, PT will transmit the same signal xP during two
time slots, and PR will use theMRC technique to combine
these received signals to increase the decoding capacity.
The received SNR at PR is given as





where g51 and g52 are the channel gains of link PT-PR
in the first and second time slots, respectively, and we
assume that g51 and g52 are independent exponential RVs
with the same parameter λ5.
Lemma 1. The CDF of RV γDTMRC can be expressed in the
exact closed form as



























where fg51(t) = λ5e−λ5t and Fg52(t) = 1 − e−λ5t are the




γ − t) in (28) is calculated as Fg52(x
/
γ −
t) = 1 − e−λ5(x/γ−t). Then, substituting fg51(t) and
Fg52(x
/
γ − t) into (28), Lemma 1 is proven.
From Lemma 1, the outage probability of the DT proto-










= 1 − (1 + λ5θ/γ ) e−λ5θ/γ
(29)
3.1.2 Symbol error rate
The average SER of link PT-ST in the first time slot can be







e−bxFγ g31(x)√x dx (30)
where a and b are constants that depend on the modula-
tion type, e.g., a = b = 1 for BPSK modulation, γ g31 is
the received SNR at ST, and Fγ g31(x) is the CDF of the RV
γ g31 and is given as Fγ g31(x) = 1 − e−λ3x/γ .









When ST successfully decodes xP, PR receives two sig-
nal paths such as the direct path from PT and the coopera-
tive path from ST at the different time slots. To restore xP,
PR performs the MRC decoding by storing the received
signal yPT-PR (3) at the first time slot and then waiting to
the second time slot to combine with the received sig-
nal yST-PR (6). Two received signals yPT-PR and yST-PR in
the two-phase transmission can be seen as an equiva-
lent single-input multi-output (SIMO) [5]. As described in
[4,5], the MRC decoding is easier to implement. With the
help of the equation [28, Eq. (27)], the average SER at PR









Note that the regeneration of xP can be performed by
theminimummean square error decoding (MMSE decod-
ing) [29,30]. The analysis of SER in the MMSE decoding
is complex because it relates resolution of posterior distri-
butions. The MMSE decoding will be our future work.
To solve SERMRCPT-PR in the formula (32), Theorem 3 is
obtained as follows:
















































where Erfc[x] is the complementary error function [31, Eq.
(8.250.4)].
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After some manipulations of (34), the proof of
Theorem 3 is completed.





(1−α)γ du depends on variable x and the func-
tionm (u) = λ5u+αλ2/u has a complex form. Hence, the
analysis of SERMRCPT-PR in the lower bound form as PMRCPT-PR in
Theorem 2 is not feasible.
When node ST does not successfully decode xP , PR only
directly receives the signal xP in the first time slot. The
















where Fγ g5(x) is the CDF of the exponential RV γ g5 and is
expressed as Fγ g5(x) = 1 − e−λ5x/γ .
Using the law of total probability, the average SER of
the cooperative communication between the primary and







where SERPT-ST, SERPT-PR, and SER
MRC
PT-PR are obtained in
(31), (35), and Theorem 3, respectively.
For the DT protocol with a fair evaluation, PT also
transmits the same signal xP during two time slots, and
PR uses the MRC technique. The average SER of the DT































3.2 The secondary network: outage secrecy probability
and average secrecy capacity
3.2.1 Outage secrecy probability
When ST successfully decodes the signal xP, it will then
transmit the combined signal xC as (4). However, the ST
does not believe the help request of PT, because ST thinks
that PT wants to get its information. Therefore, ST only
considers the security of the important information. Phys-
ical layer security is applied at the secondary network in
Figure 1, where ST wants to secure the important infor-
mation against the eavesdropping of PT in the second





( 1 + (1 − α) γ g1





















where ASR is given in (12), RS is the target secrecy rate
[18], and RPT-SR is the achievable data rate from PT to SR
and is obtained from (2) as
RPT-SR = 12 log2
(
1 + γ g4
)
(40)









( 1 + (1 − α) γ g1




































Theorem 4. The following closed-form expression is valid
for P1ASR
P1ASR = 1 −
λ3e−λ1(ρ−1)/((1−α)γ )
λ3 + ρλ1 (42)
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Proof. By expanding the expression {x}+ in P1ASR (41),




]+ Pr [g32 < g1 < ρ − 1
(1 − α) γ + ρg32
]
















where fg32(x), Fg1 (x) are the PDF and CDF of RVs g32 and
g1, respectively, and are given as follows: fg32(x) = λ3e−λ3x
and Fg1(x) = 1 − e−λ1x; ρ = 22RS .
Hence, Fg1
(
(ρ − 1)/((1 − α) γ ) + ρx) in (43) is
obtained as Fg1
(
(ρ − 1)/((1 − α) γ ) +ρx) = 1−
e−λ1((ρ−1)/((1−α)γ )+ρx). Then, substituting fg32(x) and
Fg1
(
(ρ − 1)/((1 − α) γ ) + ρx) into (43), the proof of
Theorem 4 is provided.
Likewise, the probability P2ASR is solved in the next
theorem.
Theorem 5. The following single-integral form represen-




1 , ρα ≥ 1









(αγ )dy, ρα < 1
(44)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix 3.




y, y ∈ [0, (1 − ρα)/
(1 − α) ]. By performing a function survey method, n(y)
is an increasing function in
[
0, (1 − ρα)/(1 − α)]. As a
result of the increasing function n(y), we have an inequal-
ity as n (y) ≤ n ((1 − ρα)/(1 − α)). Hence, the lower





















α(1−α)γρ , ρα < 1
(45)
Substituting the result of Theorems 4 and 5 into (41), we
have PoutASR in hand. Finally, the outage secrecy probability





PoutASR + PoutPT-ST (46)
where PoutPT-ST is given in (17).
In addition, from the lower bound of P2ASR in (45), the





Pout_lowerASR + PoutPT-ST (47)
where Pout_lowerASR is obtained from (41) as





3.2.2 Average secrecy capacity
In the operation protocol of the secondary network, ST
only transmits the secrecy signals when ST successfully
decodes the primary signal xP of PT. The average secrecy
capacity of the secondary network is defined by calculat-
ing the expected value over ASR [32], ([33] Eq. (8)), ([34]
Eq. (3)). In addition, the ASR expression in (12) depends
on the decoding of the primary signal xP at SR (10-
11). Hence, the average secrecy capacity of the secondary
network is formulated as
CSNavg =
ST successfully










( 1+(1 − α) γ g1














⎝ 1 + (1−α)γ g1αγ g1+1











where E [X] is the expected operation of RV X; PoutPT-SR
is the outage probability when SR cannot successfully
decode the signal xP in the first time slot and is obtained
as




































where Z = g1
/(
αγ g1 + 1
)
as defined in Appendix 3.
Theorem 6. The following asymptotic expressions are
valid for C1avg and C2avg , respectively
C1avg ≈
ln (1 + λ3/λ1)





















where  (n, x) is the ‘upper’ incomplete gamma func-
tion ([31] Eq. (8.350.2)) ( (n, x) = ∫∞x tn−1e−tdt),
and EulerGamma is Euler’s constant (EulerGamma ≈
0.577216) ([31] Eq. (8.367.1)).
Proof. The proof is solved in Appendix 4.
Substituting (17), (50), and the results of Theorem 6
into (49), we obtain the asymptotic form of the average


























4 Numerical and simulative results
In this section, the performance of the primary and sec-
ondary networks is analyzed by using the Monte Carlo
simulation method and the theoretical expressions. The
performance analyses include the outage probability and
SER of the primary network and the outage secrecy prob-
ability and the average secrecy capacity of the secondary
network. We note that the single-integral expression of
(21) and (44) and the double-integral expression of (33)
are not presented in the closed forms but are easily
solved by the numerical method in Matlab. In a two-
dimensional plane, the coordinates of the primary and
secondary nodes are set to PT (0, 0), PR (1, 0), ST (0.5,
y1), and SR (0.5, y2). Hence, the distance of the PT-PR
link is 1 (d5 = 1) during the simulation intervals, and
ST and SR move on the median line of the PT-PR line
segment, which depend on the values of the variables y1
and y2 on the y-axis. We assume that the path loss expo-
nent, the target data rate of the primary network, and
the target secrecy rate of the secondary network are con-
stants (β = 3, RP = 1 bit/s/Hz,RS = 0.1 bit/s/Hz),
and the SNR symbol in the x-axis is defined as
SNR = P/N0.
Figure 2 presents the outage probability of the primary
network at PR versus SNR (dB) when y1 = 0.1 and
with different values of the power allocation at ST (α).
In Figure 2, for the cooperative communication protocol
(called the CC protocol), the outage probability of the pri-
mary network is the smallest when α is the largest (α =
0.9), and the primary system performance is improved
when the SNR increases. These results are explained that
when the fraction of the transmit power α increases, ST
uses more power for forwarding the signal of PT to PR
in the second time slot. For comparison purposes, the CC
protocol outperforms the DT protocol when ST shares the
high power to help PT (α ≥ 0.8). In addition, the the-
oretical expressions match very well with the simulation
results, and the lower bound forms converge to the exact
theories when the fractions of the transmit power α are
small.
In addition to the outage probability, the SER is suitable
for evaluating the QoS of the primary network. Figure 3
presents the SER of the primary network with the same
ST location as in Figure 2. In this simulation result, we
assume that the cooperative system uses the BPSK modu-
lation (e.g., a = b = 1) and coherent maximum likelihood
detection [35]. The SER of the CC protocol is the small-
est at α = 0.9. For different values of α, the SER of
the CC protocol is smaller than that of the DT proto-
col when SNR ≤ −1 dB for α = 0.5, SNR < 8 dB for
α = 0.7, and SNR < 17 dB for α = 0.8. These results
are explained as follows. In the symmetric network model,
when the fraction of the transmit power α is enough large
(such as α = 0.5, 0.7, 0.8), the demodulation of the pri-
mary data at PR depends on the total transmit power P
of ST in the second time slot. For example, if ST uses the
small total transmit power P, PR is difficult to demodu-
late the primary data when α is fixed. Therefore, the SER
at PR will increase. In addition, in the DT protocol, by
transmitting the same primary data during two time slots,
PR will increase the demodulation capacity by the MRC
technique.
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Figure 2 Outage probability of the primary network at PR versus SNR (dB) when y1 = 0.1. The markers denote simulated results, whereas
solid and dash lines refer to theoretical results and lower bounds, respectively.
From Figures 3 and 4, the performance of the CC
protocol is better than that of the DT protocol at high val-
ues of α (e.g., α = 0.9), because the located power for
helping the primary user PT is higher by far than that for
transmitting the own signal of the secondary user ST.
Figure 4 presents the outage secrecy probability of the
secondary network versus the SNR (dB) when y1 = 0.1
and y2 = 0. In Figure 4, the outage secrecy probability
decreases when the SNR increases and α decreases (the
secrecy performance is the best when α = 0.1). These
results are explained that when α decreases, ST uses
more power for transmitting the own signal than for-
warding the signal of PT to PR in the second time slot.
In addition, with the high SNR (SNR ≥ 10 dB), the
outage secrecy probability is almost independent of the
values of α. Hence, from Figures 2, 3 and 4, ST can
provide the high power to help the primary network so
that the performance of the cooperative primary network
(the CC protocol) outperforms the DT protocol and the
secure performance of the secondary network is main-
tained, especially in the high SNR region. For example,
when SNR ≈ 12 dB, the outage secrecy probability
of the secondary network is maintained at 5 × 10−2,
and ST can assign the parameter α = 0.9 to improve
the performance of the primary network. In addition,
the theoretical expressions are valid for the simulation
results, and the lower bound forms converge to the exact
results when the fractions of the transmit power α are
large.
Next, we discuss the average secrecy capacity of the
secondary network when ST cooperates with the pri-
mary network. Figure 5 presents the average secrecy
capacity versus the SNR (dB) when the locations of
nodes ST and SR are the same as in Figure 4. In
Figure 5, the average secrecy capacity increases when
α decreases because the allocated power for transmit-
ting the signal of ST increases. In addition, the aver-
age secrecy capacity also converges to the asymptotic
value when the transmit SNR is high, but the conver-
gence of the average secrecy capacity is faster when α is
smaller.
Finally, we analyze and evaluate the effects of the loca-
tions of the secondary nodes ST and SR on the perfor-
mance of both networks. Figure 6 presents the outage
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Figure 3 SER of the primary network at PR versus SNR (dB) when y1 = 0.1.
probability and the outage secrecy probability of the pri-
mary network and the secondary network, respectively,
when the parameter α is set to α = 0.9. In Figure 6, when
SR is fixed at (0.5, 0) and the ST moves on the median
line of the PT-PR line segment where y1 ranges from
0.1 to 1, the performance of both networks decreases.
These results are explained as follows. Because of the
movement of ST, the distances of links PT-ST, ST-PR,
and ST-SR increase, so it is difficult for ST to decode
the received signal from PT, and the data rate at SR
decreases. Whereas, when ST is set at the central point
(0.5, 0) and SR moves on the median line of the PT-PR
line segment where y2 ranges from 0.1 to 1, the outage
probability of the primary network does not change, while
the outage secrecy probability of the secondary network
increases. These results are explained by three factors
as follows. First, the primary network does not depend
on the action of SR. Second, because SR goes farther,
SR hardly decodes the signal of PT to cancel the inter-
ference elements. Third, the distance of the ST-SR link
increases. For these reasons, the performance of the sec-
ondary network is poor, while that of the primary network
is stable. From Figure 6, the lower bound forms of the out-
age secrecy probabilities well converge to the exact results
when α = 0.9.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the artifice of the primary user in the spec-
trum lease is investigated. The basis of this problem is
based on the transmission desire of the secondary user.
The system performance of the primary network is evalu-
ated by using the outage probability and the symbol error
rate, while that of the secondary network is analyzed in
terms of the outage secrecy probability and the asymptotic
average secrecy capacity. The simulation results show
that the primary network outperforms the direct trans-
mission protocol when the spectrum share coefficient of
the secondary user increases and that the secrecy per-
formance of the secondary network is better in the high
SNR region. These results are important for selecting the
best power sharing fraction so that the performance of
the primary network is improved and the secrecy per-
formance of the secondary network is maintained in the
cooperative communication. In addition, the location of
the secondary nodes is discussed to evaluate the effects on
both networks.
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Figure 4 The outage secrecy probability of the secondary network versus SNR (dB) when y1 = 0.1 and y2 = 0. The markers denote
simulated results, whereas solid and dash lines refer to theoretical results and lower bounds, respectively.
Appendices
Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 1
We set U = αg2
/(
(1 − α) γ g2 + 1
)










1 , x ≥ α
(1−α)γ
1 − e−λ2x/(α−x(1−α)γ ) , x < α
(1−α)γ
(56)
From (8), the CDF of γMRC is expressed as
FγMRC(x) = Pr [γMRC < x] = Pr
[














where fg5(t) = λ5e−λ5t is the PDF of the RV g5.
The term FU(x
/




























α−(θ/γ−t)(1−α)γ dt , x ≥ α1−α





α−(θ/γ−t)(1−α)γ dt , x < α1−α
(59)
Performing a variable transformation method as u =
α − (θ/γ − t) (1 − α) γ , FγMRC(x) is solved in the single-
integral form as (20). Hence, Theorem 1 is proven.
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Figure 5 Average secrecy capacity of the secondary network versus SNR (dB) when y1 = 0.1 and y2 = 0.
Appendix 2
Proof of Theorem 2
First, we consider the condition θ ≥ α/(1 − α) and the
integral expression in the region u ∈ [0,α] in (21), there
are two minimum values of the functionm(u) as




m (α) whenα < u∗
m (u∗) whenα ≥ u∗ (60)
Substituting u∗ = √αλ2/λ5 into (60), we obtain as




m (α) when θ ≥ α/(1 − α), η > α
m (u∗) when θ ≥ α/(1 − α), η ≤ α (61)
where η = λ2/λ5.
When the condition θ < α
/
(1 − α) and the integral
expression in the region u ∈ [α − θ (1 − α) ,α], three
minimum values of the functionm(u) are given as





m (α) whenα < u∗
m (u∗) whenα ≥ u∗ > α − θ (1 − α)
m (α − θ (1 − α)) whenu∗ ≤ α − θ (1 − α)
(62)
After some manipulations of (62), we obtain as





m (α) when θ < α
/
(1 − α), η > α
m (u∗) when θ < α
/
(1 − α),α ≥ η > (α − θ (1 − α))2/2
m (α − θ (1 − α)) when θ < α/(1 − α), η ≤ (α − θ (1 − α))2/2
(63)
Substituting (61) and (63) into (21), the lower bound






























m (α) , η > α
m (u∗) , η ≤ α and  =⎧⎨
⎩
m (α) , η > α
m (u∗) ,α ≥ η>(α−θ (1−α))2/2
m (α − θ (1 − α)) , η ≤ (α − θ (1 − α))2/2 .
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Figure 6 The outage probability and the outage secrecy probability versus y1/y2 with α = 0.9. The markers denote simulated results,
whereas solid and dash lines refer to theoretical results and lower bounds, respectively.
By solving the integrals in (64), the proof of Theorem 2
is completely provided.
Appendix 3
Proof of Theorem 5
By expanding the expression {x}+ in P2ASR (41), the proba-
bility P2ASR is given as
P2ASR =
[ g1






αγ g1 + 1 <
ρ − 1




αγ g1 + 1 <
ρ − 1
(1 − α) γ + ρg32
]
(65)
We set Z = g1
/(
αγ g1 + 1
)
and look at the CDF of the











1 , x ≥ (αγ )−1
1 − e−λ1x/(1−αγ x), x < (αγ )−1
(66)




















λ3x+ (ρ−1)/((1−α)γ )+ρx1−((ρ−1)/((1−α)γ )+ρx)αγ
)
dx, ρα < 1
(67)
After performing a variable transformation method as
y = 1 − ((ρ − 1)/((1 − α) γ ) +ρx) αγ , P2ASR is obtained
in the single-integral form as (44). Hence, the proof of
Theorem 5 is completed.
Appendix 4
Proof of Theorem 6
We set X = g1
/






















From (69) and the expression of the expected operation
















Solving the integral in (70), C1avg is obtained as (53).
To solve C2avg, we set Y = Z
/
g32, where Z is a RV and is











In (71), the CDF of Z is solved in (66), and then FY (x) is
rewritten as
FY (x) = 1 − λ3
∫ (αγ x)−1
0 e−λ3y−λ1xy/(1−αγ xy)dy





αγ x− λ1αγ t dt
(72)
Again, when γ is high (γ → +∞), the integral term in
(72) goes to 1. Hence, FY (x) is asymptotically obtained as
FY (x) ≈ 1 − λ3e
λ1/(αγ )e−λ3/(αγ x)
αγ x (73)
From (73), the PDF of RV Y is solved as









From (74) and the expression of the expected operation



































Solving the integral in (75), we obtain C2avg as (54).
Hence, the proof of Theorem 6 is proven.
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